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ABSTRACT 
In the last two decades electricity distribution sector have witnessed a wave of 
regulatory reforms aimed at improving efficiency through incentive regulation. Most of 
these regulation schemes use benchmarking namely measuring a company’s efficiency 
and rewarding them accordingly. The reliability of efficiency estimates is crucial for an 
effective implementation of those incentive mechanisms. A main problem faced by the 
regulators is the choice among several legitimate benchmarking models that usually 
produce different results. After a brief overview of the benchmarking methodologies, this 
paper summarizes the methods used in the regulation practice in several OECD countries, 
in which the benchmarking practice is relatively widespread. Repeated observation of 
similar companies over time namely panel data, allows a better understanding of 
unobserved firm-specific factors and disentangling them from efficiency estimates. 
Focusing on parametric cost frontier models, this paper presents two alternative 
approaches that could be used to improve the reliability of benchmarking methods, and 
based on recent empirical evidence, draws some recommendations for regulatory practice 
in power distribution networks.   2
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Transmission and distribution of electricity have been considered as natural 
monopolies, thus less affected by the recent waves of deregulation in power industry. 
However, as competition is being introduced into generation sector, regulatory reform 
and incentive regulation of distribution utilities have become more common. In 
traditional cost-of-service regulation systems companies recover their costs with a risk-
free fixed rate of return and therefore have little incentive to minimize costs. The 
incentive- or performance-based schemes on the other hand, are designed to provide 
incentive for productive efficiency by compensating the company with part of its cost 
savings. A variety of methods have been proposed in the literature.1 Main categories of 
incentive regulation systems used for electricity utilities are: price/revenue cap schemes, 
sliding-scale rate of return, partial cost adjustment, menu of contracts, and yardstick 
competition.2 One of the most widely used methods in electricity networks is price cap 
regulation (RPI-X). This method sets the maximum rate of increase for the regulated 
prices equal to the inflation rate of retail prices index (RPI) minus a productivity growth 
offset referred to as X-factor.3 The regulated companies can therefore increase (lose) their 
profits if they improve their productivity at a higher (lower) rate than the assigned X-
factor. 
For the definition of X-factor the regulators around the world have used several 
options. In the first option based on the original price-cap approach (cf. Beesley and 
                                                           
1 See Joskow (2006) and Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) for a review of regulation models.  
2 Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) provide an extensive survey of different regulation practices in electricity 
markets around the world. 
3 In addition to inflation, the changes beyond companies’ control may include changes in input factor 
prices and exogenous changes in demand and network characteristics generally referred to as Z-factors.     3
Littlechild, 1989; Brennan, 1989), X-factor is set equal to the annual expected or target 
growth rate of the total factor productivity (TFP) in the entire sector. This option has been 
employed mostly by the US regulators. In the second option used in relatively new 
regulatory regimes (mostly adopted by European regulators) X-factors are set equal to the 
annual target change in productive efficiency for each individual company. Therefore, the 
regulator can set differentiated price caps based on the companies’ efficiency 
performance estimated from a benchmarking analysis. In the latter case, there is 
differentiation between the companies based on ‘benchmarking’ that is, measuring a 
company’s productive efficiency against a reference performance.4  
The increasing use of benchmarking analysis in electricity industry has raised 
serious concerns among regulators and companies regarding the reliability of efficiency 
estimates.5 In fact the empirical evidence suggests that the estimates are sensitive to the 
adopted benchmarking approach.6 This implies that the choice of the approach can have 
important effects on the financial situation of the companies. 
There are however, alternative strategies that can be used to improve benchmarking 
methodology regarding the sensitivity issues and to provide the regulator with 
complementary tools. The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of these 
                                                           
4 Both these alternatives have certain drawbacks. While the latter option does not account for the TFP 
growth, in the former case, there is a risk of inducing undesired incentive effects. Namely relatively 
inefficient companies can benefit much more than already efficient companies that cannot further improve 
their productivity. A third alternative would consist of decomposing the TFP growth into two components: 
one due to technical progress and the other related to the firm-specific efficiency improvements. The X-
factor for each company is then taken as the sum of the first component (common for the entire sector) and 
the annual target change in the company’s efficiency. This approach has the advantage that it tailors the 
price caps to individual companies’ performance. For a discussion of this issue see Coelli et al. (2003). 
5 See Shuttleworth (2005) for a critical overview of the usage of benchmarking in regulation of electricity 
networks. 
6 See Jamasb and Pollit (2003) and Estache et al. (2004) for examples.  
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possibilities, discuss their effectiveness in the light of the recent empirical findings, and 
draw recommendations for regulatory practice.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the application of 
benchmarking in regulation practice with a focus on selected OECD countries. Section 3 
provides a general picture of different benchmarking methods and their problems. The 
alternative methods using panel data are presented in Section 4. This section also uses an 
example to illustrate some of the advantages of panel data models. Section 5 concludes 
the paper with a final discussion and policy recommendations. 
 
2.  BENCHMARKING AND REGULATORY PRACTICE IN OECD 
COUNTRIES  
The regulatory approaches show an important variation across countries. Table 1 
provides a summary of current regulatory approaches and benchmarking practices for a 
selection of OECD countries.7 This summary focuses mainly on countries that use the 
incentive regulation schemes in one way or another. The main systems used in practice 
are price/revenue cap regulation and Yardstick competition.8 Moreover, several 
regulators use the results obtained from benchmarking analysis in the application of these 
regulation systems. The conventional rate-of-return (ROR) or cost-of-service regulation, 
while still being used in many countries,9 is not considered in this review. It should be 
                                                           
7 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) for a previous summary of benchmarking methods in a selection of 
countries. It is worth noting that in several countries the regulation practice has considerably changed since 
the publication of that paper. 
8 Yardstick competition is a regulation model proposed by Schleifer (1985). In his model the price of each 
local monopolist is regulated based on average costs of other identical firms producing the same 
homogeneous good. 
9 The use of ROR is still widespread even in Europe. According to Eurelectric (2004), Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Germany and Romania use ROR method.    5
noted however that in a few cases such as Finland and Sweden, the regulators combine 
the ROR method with other incentive regulation approaches. For instance, benchmarking 
analyses can be used to estimate a reasonable return rate. In this case the ROR is 
calculated on the costs of an average typical firm or a fully efficient firm and not on the 
reported company’s own costs. This approach is in line with the yardstick competition 
model.  
Generally, the regulation terms could be set before or after the regulation period. In 
ex ante regulation the companies’ financial records in previous years are used to set the 
regulatory scheme namely price/revenue caps or budget limits at the beginning of the 
period. In ex post regulation on the other hand, the regulator examines the companies’ 
expenditures and revenues during the regulation period and compensates them 
accordingly.10 The ex post regulation allows a more flexible approach and therefore 
cannot provide as high-powered incentive mechanism as in ex ante regulation. The ex 
post regulation is practiced in a few countries such as Sweden and Finland. However, 
according to the new EU electricity directive approved in 2003, the ex ante regulation 
will become the norm throughout the European Union (Eurelectric, 2004). 
 
 
                                                           
10 See Kinnunen (2005) for more details.   6
 
 




Country Regulation  method  Approach  Explicit use of 
benchmarking  Benchmarking level  Benchmarking methods 
Australia (New 
South Wales) 
Revenue-cap until 2004, 
weighted average price 
cap from 2004 




Chile  Special case of Yardstick  Ex ante  Yes  For 5 typical zones 
Engineering economic analysis 




Rate of Return  Ex post  No  Generic
 b DEA 
Netherlands  Yardstick Ex  ante  Yes  Generic DEA 
Norway  Revenue-cap  Ex ante  Yes  Generic and individual  DEA 
Sweden  Special case of Yardstick  Ex post  Yes  Individual 
DEA, 
Performance assessment model 
(engineering analysis) 
United 
Kingdom  Price-cap  Ex ante  Yes  Generic and individual  COLS, 
Bottom-up engineering analysis 
United States 
(California) 
Price-cap with earnings 
sharing  Various No  Individual  TFP  studies 
United States 
(Maine) 
Price-cap with earnings 
sharing  Various No  Individual  TFP  studies 
 
  
a Except Chile: As one of the first countries that has de-regulated its electricity networks, Chile represents an interesting non-OECD case. 
b Planning for the use of individual efficiency scores starting from 2008. 
References: Jamasb and Pollitt (2001), Australia: IPART (2004), Irastorza (2003); Chile: Rudnick, Doloso (2000); Finland: Honkapuro et al. (2004), Energiamarkkinavirasto 
(2004); Netherlands: DTe (2005), Wals et al. (2003), Nillesen and Pollitt (2004); Norway: Ajodhia et al. (2003), Plaut (2002); Sweden: Viljainen et al. (2004), Sand and 
Nordgard (2004); United Kingdom: CEPA (2003), Irastorza (2003), Pollitt (2005); USA: CPUC (2000), MPUC (2005), Sappington et al. (2001). 
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As can be seen in Table 1, an important aspect of regulation is in the use of efficiency 
scores in the regulation schemes, such as X-factors in the price/revenue cap formula or the 
efficiency adjustment in yardstick rules. The efficiency scores can be considered as a generic 
value for all companies or as individual firm-specific values. While both approaches have 
been used in practice, there is a general tendency to use different scores for individual 
companies (Table 1). However, this practice which has become commonplace in a few 
countries like Norway (Ajodhia et al., 2003), has faced a court’s objection in a lawsuit in 
Netherlands that consequently dismissed the method in favor of generic values (Riechmann, 
2003).  
In general, there exist two approaches concerning the use of benchmarking results. 
Regulators in many countries like Chile, Norway, UK and Netherlands use in a rather 
“mechanical” way the efficiency results as an explicit part of the regulation process. In other 
countries such as US, Australia and Finland the benchmarking analysis is used only as an 
additional instrument for regulatory decisions. As for measuring efficiency, the deterministic 
methods like DEA and COLS are most commonly used. There is a growing interest however, 
in using Stochastic Frontier Analysis as a complementary method.  
 
3.  BENCHMARKING METHODS  
Benchmarking can be defined as a process of comparison of some measure of actual 
performance against a reference or benchmark. The performance of a company can be 
regarded in three main aspects: productivity, efficiency and quality. Efficiency and 
productivity are the most commonly used measure of performance in the electricity sector.11 
The focus of this paper is on productive efficiency in particular cost efficiency.12 The 
                                                           
11 See Giannakis et al. (2004) for a discussion on quality benchmarking. 
12 In addition to cost and technical efficiency, another source of inefficiency is related to deviations from 
optimal size, defined as the output level that minimizes the average costs (Chambers, 1988).   8
methods used for measuring efficiency are commonly referred to as frontier approaches.13 A 
common measure of technical inefficiency is the distance, in the output space, to the 
production frontier. This measure does not include allocative inefficiency namely, the 
potential savings by reallocating input factors. Cost-inefficiency is an input-oriented measure 
overall inefficiency, which is defined as the distance from the cost frontier.14 Each of the 
above-mentioned measures has their respective advantages and drawbacks. Estimating 
technical efficiency does not require any data on costs and prices, usually difficult to obtain, 
but it does not provide any information on cost minimization process, which is more 
appealing form an economic standpoint. The cost-inefficiency measure includes both 
allocative and technical inefficiencies but does not provide an easy way to separate these two 
components.15 An advantage of the cost efficiency approach is that it treats the output as 
given, a realistic assumption in most regulated industries where the level of output is set by 
the regulator or determined by the demand factors. 
The estimation of efficiency can be performed using a wide variety of models classified 
into to two main categories of parametric and non-parametric approaches.16 Figure 1 presents 
a general classification of efficiency measurement methods. Non-parametric approaches such 
as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) use linear programming 
to determine a company’s efficiency frontier. In these approaches the cost frontier is 
considered as a deterministic function of the observed variables and no specific functional 
                                                           
13 There exist alternative approaches like Engineering Economic Analysis and Process Benchmarking, which 
use a bottom-up methodology to calculate optimal costs and efficiency. 
14 Production frontier represents the maximum output produced by a given set of inputs, whereas cost frontier 
defines the minimum costs of producing an output level with given input prices. 
15 The only way to disentangle allocative and technical inefficiencies in a cost-frontier framework is through 
input factor demand equations. Because of the complexity of the resulting error structure, a satisfactory 
econometric solution remains to be developed (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Greene, 1997). 
16 See Murillo-Zamorano (2004) for a general presentation of different methodologies.   9
form is imposed.17 Moreover, non-parametric approaches are generally easier to estimate and 
can be implemented on small datasets. 
 
Figure 1. Efficiency measurement methods 
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A simple case of DEA, one of the most commonly used method in benchmarking, can 
be summarized as follows: In a sample of N companies with a k-input-m-output production 
function with variable returns to scale (VRS), the measurement of cost efficiency using DEA 
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where wi and xi are k×1 vectors respectively representing input prices and quantities for firm i 
(i= 1, 2, ...., N); yi is an m×x1 vector representing the given output bundle; X and Y are 
                                                           
17 See Coelli et al. (2003) for more details on DEA.    10
respectively input and output matrices namely, a k×N and a m×N matrix consisting of the 
observed input and output bundles for all the companies in the sample; N is an N×1 vector of 
ones; and λ is an N×1 vector of non-negative constants to be estimated. The VRS property is 
satisfied through the convexity constraint (Nλ=1) that ensures companies are benchmarked 
against companies with similar size.  
The minimization problem given in (1) can be solved by linear programming (LP) 
methods. The LP algorithm finds a piece-wise linear isoquant in the input space, which 
corresponds to the minimum costs of producing the given output at any given point. The 
solution gives the minimum feasible costs for each company namely, 
'*
ii wx , where 
*
i x  is the 
optimal input bundle for firm i. The cost-efficiency of each production plan is then estimated 










= , (2) 
where 
o
i x  is the observed input bundle used by company i.  
Another important group of frontier methods are parametric approaches, which 
assume a parametric form for the cost/production frontier. Apart from a few exceptions, all 
these methods have a stochastic element in their frontier function. Thus, this group of 
methods is also labeled as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The main exception with a 
deterministic frontier is the COLS method. In this approach the inefficiencies are defined 
through a constant shift of the OLS residuals (cf. Greene, 1980). As the entire stochastic term 
is considered as inefficiency, the frontier remains deterministic.  
COLS approach is based on the OLS estimation of a parametric cost function, 
usually expressed in logarithms:  
  ( ) ln , ii i i Cf y wε = + , (3)   11
where Ci is the actual costs incurred by company i, and f() is the cost function; and εi is the 
stochastic error term. After correcting this term by shifting the intercept such that all residuals 
εi are positive, the COLS model can be written as:  
  () { } { }    0 ln , min ,  with min ii ii i i i i i i Cf y w u u εε ε ≥ =++ = − , (4) 
where ui is a non-negative term representing the firm’s inefficiency. The cost-efficiency of 
firm i is then given by:  exp( ) ii Eff u = . 
  The main shortcoming of this method is that it confounds inefficiency with statistical 
noise: the entire residual is classified as inefficiency. In the stochastic frontier model the error 
term is divided into two uncorrelated parts: The first part ui, is a one-sided non-negative 
disturbance reflecting the effect of inefficiency, and the second component vi, is a symmetric 
disturbance capturing the random noise. Usually the statistical noise is assumed to be 
normally distributed, while the inefficiency term ui  is assumed to follow a half-normal 
distribution.18 A basic SFA model can be written as:  
  ( ) ln , ii i i i Cf y wu v = ++, (5) 
This model with a normal-half-normal composite error term can be estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation method. Similarly the cost-efficiency of firm i is given by: 
exp( ) ii Eff u = . 
SFA models allow for a random unobserved heterogeneity among different firms (as 
represented by vi) but need to specify a functional form for the cost or production function. 
The main advantage of such methods over non-parametric approaches is the separation of the 
inefficiency effect from the statistical noise due to data errors, omitted variables etc. The non-
parametric methods’ assumption of a unique deterministic frontier for all production units is 
unrealistic. Another advantage of parametric methods is that these methods allow statistical 
                                                           
18 Other extensions of this model have also considered exponential and truncated normal distributions for the 
inefficiency term. See for instance Battese and Coelli (1992).   12
inference on the effect of the variables included in the model, using standard statistical tests. 
In non-parametric methods on the other hand, statistical inference requires elaborate and 
sensitive re-sampling methods like bootstrap techniques.19  
The complete analysis of the comparative advantages and drawbacks of the parametric 
and non-parametric approaches is beyond the scope of this study.20 Although neither of the 
two approaches has emerged as a dominant method in the scientific community, the DEA 
method is the most commonly used approach in benchmarking practice in electricity industry. 
This can be explained by the relative simplicity of DEA models and the possibility of their 
implementation in a small data set. Stochastic frontier methods on the other hand require 
several choices, mainly on the functional form and distribution assumptions, which many 
practitioners might find difficult to explain.  
It is important to note that even within each approach there exist several models that can 
be used and the choice of model is not usually straightforward. Several studies have reported 
discrepancies in efficiency estimates between different approaches and model specifications. 
For instance, using a cross section of 63 power distribution utilities in Europe, Jamasb and 
Pollit (2003) show that there are substantial variations in estimated efficiency scores and rank 
orders across different approaches (parametric and non-parametric) and among different 
econometric models. Similarly, using data from South America, Estache et al. (2004) provide 
evidence of “weak consistency” between parametric and non-parametric methods.21 These 
results are supported by two other studies (Farsi and Filippini, 2004; 2005) that show that the 
efficiency ranking of the companies can differ significantly across econometric models and 
across different approaches. Such discrepancies are partly due to methodological sensitivity 
                                                           
19 These methods are available for rather special cases and have not yet been established as standard tests. See 
Simar and Wilson (2000) for an overview of statistical inference methods in non-parametric models. 
20 See Murillo-Zamorano (2004) and Coelli et al. (2003) for further discussion. 
21 Other authors like Horrace and Schmidt (1996), Street (2003) and Jensen (2000) reported substantial errors 
and inconsistency problems in the estimation of individual efficiency scores in cross sectional data.   13
in the estimation of individual efficiency scores and are not limited to a specific network 
industry.22 The regulated companies operate in different regions with various environmental 
and network characteristics that are only partially observed. Given that the unobserved factors 
are considered differently in each method,23 the resulting estimates could vary across 
methods. One can expect that the magnitude of variation depends on the importance of the 
unobserved factors, which might change from one case to another.  
In most cases, there is no clear criterion for the choice of the model and approach. Thus, 
it is assumed that the results are valid if they are independently obtained from several models. 
For instance, Bauer et al. (1998) have proposed a series of criteria that can be used to evaluate 
if the efficiency estimates from different methods are mutually “consistent”, that is, lead to 
comparable scores and ranks. However, the empirical results suggest that these criteria are 
not satisfied in many cases in network industries. The significant uncertainties in efficiency 
estimates could have important undesired consequences especially because in many cases the 
estimated efficiency scores are directly used to reward/punish individual companies through 
regulation schemes such as price-cap formulas. 
Given the above problems, it is not surprising that the benchmarking models used in 
electricity networks have been frequently criticized.24 In the next section, we discuss the 
ways that panel data can be used with parametric methods to overcome some of these 
shortcomings and provide more attractive instruments to use in regulation.25 In particular, we 
focus on two possibilities: First, a better control for the firm- or network-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity, which is a source of discrepancy across different benchmarking methods; and 
                                                           
22 Horrace and Schmidt (1996), Street (2003) and Jensen (2000) reported substantial errors and inconsistency 
problems in the estimation of individual efficiency scores in cross sectional data. The former paper shows that 
such problems persist in a panel data set with six periods. 
23 While the econometric approach uses additive stochastic terms, the linear programming method allows 
heterogeneity in production by relaxing the restrictions imposed by a specific functional form.  
24 See for instance Shuttlewoth (2003) and Irastorza (2003). 
25 Some of these alternative models have been used in a few recent studies (Alvarez et al., 2004; Greene, 2005; 
Farsi and Filippini, 2004; Farsi, Filippini and Greene, 2006).   14
secondly, the possibility of moving from point estimates for efficiencies to confidence 
intervals for predicted costs. Both improvements rely on repeated observations over several 
periods namely, panel data. The use of panel data models is especially interesting as data for 
several years have become available to an increasing number of regulators in many countries.  
 
4.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES USING PANEL DATA 
The stochastic frontier literature provides a variety of panel data models. These models 
have been explained elsewhere.26 There are several ways of classifying these models. Some 
of the main categories are given in Figure 1. Here, for the sake of our analysis we consider 
two groups that we label as “conventional” and “true” panel models. By conventional we 
refer to all the panel data models that deduce the efficiency estimates from the individual 
firm-specific effects, which can be fixed or random. These include original models like Pitt 
and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) that interpreted the individual effects as time-
invariant (in)efficiency as well as the extensions like Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) 
and Battese and Coelli (1992) that incorporate the variation of efficiency over time as a 
deterministic function that is similar across firms.27 The main restriction of these models is 
that the unobserved factors are random over time and across firms, which implies that the 
unobserved network and environmental characteristics that are usually time-invariant are not 
considered as heterogeneity. Moreover, with a few recent exceptions such as Sickles (2005), 
the variation of efficiency over time is deterministic and/or follows a same functional form 
for all firms. Given that sources of inefficiency depend on technology shocks and other 
                                                           
26 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for a survey of conventional models and Dorfman and Koop (2005) for an 
overview of recent developments. A brief discussion of a selection of models is also given in Farsi, Filippini and 
Kuenzle (2005).  
27 In the model proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles the parameters of the time function can vary across 
firms. Recent developments such as Han et al. (2005) and Sickles (2005) consider more general temporal 
variation.   15
variations in the input markets and the managers’ abilities to cope with them, it can be argued 
that inefficiencies are random over time.28 
The “true” panel models extend the original stochastic frontier model (Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt, 1977) to panel data by adding an individual time-invariant effect. These models 
(Kumbhakar, 1991; Polachek and Yoon, 1996; and more recently Greene, 2005) include two 
stochastic terms for unobserved heterogeneity, one for the time-variant factors and one for the 
firm-specific constant characteristics. Assuming that network and environmental 
characteristics and their effects on production do not vary considerably over time and that the 
inefficiency is time-variant, these models help separate these unobserved effects from 
efficiency estimates. 
To illustrate the differences between conventional and “true” panel models, here we 
summarize the results reported in Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2006). That paper applies three 
models to a panel of 59 Swiss electricity utilities to estimate a total cost function. The models 
include GLS (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984), MLE (Pitt and Lee, 1981), and the true random 
effects (TRE) model (Greene, 2005).29 A descriptive summary of the efficiency estimates 
from different models and their correlation matrix are given in Table 2. As indicated in the 
table, while GLS and MLE models give similar results (12 to 15 percent excess costs), the 
TRE model predicts a much higher average efficiency rate, implying only about 4 percent 
excess in costs. The results also suggest a high correlation between GLS and MLE estimates 
whereas the TRE estimates show a weak correlation with the conventional models. Noting 
that this model assumes a time-variant inefficiency term and a separate stochastic term for 
firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity, these results suggest that the other models might 
overestimate the inefficiency. This conclusion is valid to the extent that inefficiencies do not 
                                                           
28 Alvarez et al. (2004) show that even in cases where inefficiency is due to time-invariant factors such as 
constant managers’ capability, the resulting inefficiencies can vary over time because it depends on a host of 
time-variant factors that have an interacting effect with the manager’s skills.   16
remain constant over time and unobserved network effects remain constant.30 However, one 
should bear in mind that these relatively new models can only give a partial solution to the 
sensitivity problems.  
 
Table 2. Efficiency scores of Swiss distribution utilities (Farsi, Filippini and Greene, 2006) 
  GLS  MLE  TRE 
Average  .868 .887 .957 
Minimum  .723 .735 .861 
Maximum  1 .993  .996 
  Correlation Coefficients:  
with GLS  1  .970 .042 
with MLE  .970  1  .055 
 
When panel data is available, the regulators have also the possibility of using some 
panel data parametric methods for the prediction of intervals for companies’ costs. The 
predicted intervals can consequently be used in the application of yardstick competition 
(Schleifer, 1985) among companies or to assess if the costs reported by the companies and 
used, for instance in ROR regulation, are reasonable. In these cases, the regulated companies 
are required to contain the costs within the interval imposed by the regulator, or have to 
justify any costs beyond the predicted range. A similar approach has been used in the water 
supply regulation in Italy.31 Though in principle this approach is also possible in cross-
sectional data, in panel data, the repeated observations of same companies are used to identify 
part of their unobserved time-invariant characteristics and adjust the predictions accordingly. 
As Farsi and Filippini (2004) show in an example, panel data frontier models allow a 
reasonably low prediction error.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29 The adopted specification of the cost frontier is a single-output Cobb-Douglas cost function with three input 
factors and several output characteristics such as load factor, number of customers and the service area size. 
30 If instead it is assumed that inefficiencies are persistent and do not change considerably over time, then the 
results obtained from conventional panel models provide better estimates of the inefficiencies. For a discussion 
of this issue see Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2006).   17
To this date the use of panel data parametric methods has been generally limited to 
academic research. However, as we have discussed above, these methods although being 
short of a perfect solution to all sensitivity problems, can provide the regulators with useful 
information. Given that in many cases panel data are increasingly available, the number of 
applications of these methods in regulatory practice should increase in the future.  
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As efficiency has become a main concern in electricity networks, benchmarking 
analysis of the companies’ inefficiency levels is increasingly used as an instrument to monitor 
the companies and induce cost-saving incentives. Benchmarking can be used in various forms 
in regulation schemes. For instance, the efficiency estimates of different firms can be used to 
adjust their X-factor in price cap regulation to differentiate maximum prices across 
companies.32 Benchmarking can also be used to reduce the information disadvantage of the 
regulator regarding the companies’ expenditures. For instance, parametric frontier methods 
can be used to predict costs in order to assess if the reported company’s costs used in ROR 
regulation are “reasonable”.  
This paper’s survey of different regulatory practices in a selected set of OECD countries 
shows that in many countries the regulators are moving toward a performance-based 
regulation system that uses the results of benchmarking analysis in one way or another. In 
some countries the regulators use these results in an explicit and rather “mechanical” way, 
while in others benchmarking results are used only as an additional instrument for regulatory 
decisions. .  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
31 See Antonioli and Filippini (2001) for more details. 
32 See also Carrington et al. (2004) for an application in gas distribution networks. 
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As shown in several studies and laid out in this paper, the empirical evidence suggests 
that the results obtained from benchmarking analysis are sensitive to the adopted methods. In 
this paper, we discuss the ways that panel data can be used with specific parametric frontier 
models to overcome some of these shortcomings and provide more effective instruments to 
use in regulation. However, it should be noted that the individual efficiency estimates could 
remain sensitive to the assumptions regarding the adopted approach and model specification. 
The results reported in this paper also suggest that these panel data models can be used in an 
effective way to predict costs within an interval.  
From this discussion and the empirical analysis available in previous studies, we can 
draw several implications for the regulators. First, the results obtained from benchmarking 
analysis on efficiency should not be used in a mechanical way in the implementation of price 
cap regulation. Rather, such results should be used as an additional instrument for regulatory 
decisions. Secondly, panel data parametric frontier models could be used to estimate 
confidence intervals for one-year-ahead costs. The predicted intervals can be then used to 
implement a yardstick regulation framework in line with Schleifer (1985), or as an alternative 
to judge if the costs reported by the companies and used, for instance in ROR regulation, are 
adequate. In this latter case predicted cost intervals could be used to reduce the regulator’s 
information disadvantage in assessing reasonable costs for each firm.33 We contend that this 
is the right role of benchmarking analysis in regulation. Third, any benchmarking analysis 
should be flexible and open to legitimate modifications for instance including additional 
variables and network characteristics requested by the companies. Therefore, the interaction 
between the regulator and companies and the possibility of iterative analysis are important 
factors that can improve the benchmarking practice in electricity networks. 
 
                                                           
33 See Joskow (2006) for other applications of yardstick model for reducing information asymmetry.   19
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